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This article presents qualitative data on the reintegrating role that can be played 
by a traditional confl ict-resolving mechanism in the eastern Hararghe zone of 
Oromiya regional state. The study was conducted in one of the districts of the 
eastern Hararghe zone where resource-based inter- and intragroup confl icts are 
widely observed. The data used in the study were generated from one-on-one 
interviews, focus group discussions, and document analysis during fi eld work 
in the selected district. The study revealed that confl icts in the research site 
emanate from stiff competition among parties over scarce resources. Individuals’ 
avaricious behaviour, dilemmas, and uncertainty over their subjective and 
objective interests create competing goals, polarised groups and tensions, which 
in turn lead the parties to the confl icts. The confl icts become complex and 
cyclical due to unaddressed animosity, fear, frustration, and anger developed 
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among parties in conflict. The study indicated that in spite of its declining power 
and sphere of influence, a community-based traditional conflict resolution 
mechanism called ‘Gumaa’ plays a great role in constructively resolving the 
inter- and intragroup conflicts and reintegrating the conflicting parties– 
revitalising the socio-psychological factors which contribute to peace. 
1. Introduction
No society in this world loves conflict. However, as long as people live together, 
work together, and interact with each other, disputes remain inevitable between 
sub-groups or individuals in a group, or between different groups. When these 
disputes are fuelled by emotion and become unsolvable, they develop into intra- 
and intergroup conflicts. The source of the conflicts could be the incompatibility 
of the objective and/or subjective interests of groups or individuals (Fisher and 
Keashly, cited in Fetherston 2000). The subjective elements like perceptions, 
attitudes, values, needs, and understandings have no limit, while objective 
elements like competition over scarce resources, quests for empowerment, and 
claims for autonomy remain relative concepts and usually create incompatibility 
of goals which in turn may lead to violence. Thus, conflict becomes unavoidable 
social behaviour (Shapiro 2004). 
According to Deutsch (2006a), the socio-psychological factors are more 
fundamental in the processes of conflict and in the constructive resolution 
of conflicts. These factors serve both as causes of conflict and as bed-rocks 
for reestablishing sustainable peace among the conflicting parties. Analysing 
these factors is therefore helpful in explaining why and how normative and 
perceptual processes create barriers to conflict resolution (Kelman 2009). 
Normative processes involve social factors that encourage conflict behaviour 
while perceptive processes refer to the cognitive process of interpreting conflict-
related information (Kelman 2007). 
This particular study is qualitative research conducted to investigate the roles of a 
traditional conflict resolution mechanism in addressing the socio-psychological 
causes of conflicts and in resolving inter- and intragroup conflicts constructively. 
The data were generated from elders, youth and women representatives, and 
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government officers, including those who are working in the formal justice 
systems. Data were collected through observation, one-on-one interviews, and 
focus group discussions. Finally, key findings were organised thematically and 
discussed in the forthcoming sections. 
1.1 Socio-psychological factors causing conflict
Though groups may be compatible in their subjective and/or objective needs, 
conflict remains an inevitable feature of their behaviour due to incompatible 
socio-psychological factors. These factors could include, but are not limited to, 
lack of security and trust, emotions, motivations, beliefs, and dissatisfaction over 
the incompatibility of their goals, all of which may result in fear and suspicion 
among parties. 
In conflict situations, parties usually become violent due to lack of control 
over their emotions. In general, according to Jeong (2010:45), ‘violent conflict 
may be inescapable in human (parties’) relationships due to unconscious 
motivations alone or in combination with competition for limited supplies of 
basic necessities’. However, nobody was born violent. According to Castro and 
Galace (2008:80), ‘Humans do not have a violent brain. There is nothing in our 
neuropsychological makeup that compels us to react violently. How we react is 
shaped by how we have been conditioned and socialized’. So, what parties learn 
is what they do and what they do becomes behaviour over time. 
Parties develop violent behaviour through time due to the incompatibility 
between the way one perceives the surrounding environment and the way that 
particular environment responds to one’s needs and desires. At the research 
site, immediate environmental pressures like scarcity of resources, cultural 
factors such as socially constructed values of wealth, and individuals’ avaricious 
behaviour, all could create a social context in which unhealthy competition 
among groups or individuals would flourish. When people perceive the 
surrounding situation as an impeding factor to their desired goals and needs, 
the psychological factors like emotion and negative attitudes trigger them to 
proactively manifest their fears and frustrations in a violent way. This violent 
behaviour is subjectively constructed, shaped, and justified, based on specific 
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social, cultural, and environmental contexts. These contexts secure the 
legitimacy of the actions used to overcome what is perceived as threats and 
obstacles to the desired goals and/or expectations. This situation in general 
affects the entire social cosmos and results in inter- and intragroup conflicts 
in the district. 
According to Kelman (2007:63), the ‘subjective factors play a role in the 
perception and interpretation of events’. For example, in the case of intragroup 
conflicts in the district, conflicting parties may not have goals that are intractable 
as such. However, when one party perceives others as its potential competitors, 
rather than  cooperators, for the existing resources, whether abundant or scarce, 
that party starts to look for culturally, or socially, or environmentally justifiable 
constructs (which are usually subjective) to suppress and/or eliminate those 
perceived competitors. The other party which is perceived as a threat also 
justifies its counter-attacks as self-defence. Both parties perceive their actions 
as fair and legitimate. However, fairness is not an absolute construct. What is 
fair to one party may not be fair in the eyes of the other party and the ‘that is not 
fair’ type of feeling frequently leads to conflict (Deutsch 2006b). In this case, 
both parties in conflict develop parallel images of self and others – similarly 
positive self-images and similarly negative enemy images (Kelman 2007). 
Therefore, it is not surprising that people are in conflict, even where there are 
abundant resources and compatibility of goals and needs. 
From a socio-psychological perspective, the intragroup conflicts in the 
district occur when individuals’ egocentric and avaricious human behaviour 
overruns the rational and logical mind and makes either of the parties 
respond negatively to the perceived threats, either proactively or retroactively. 
Their irrational minds overrule their rational selves when they counter-
attack their perceived competitors (usually their brothers) in aggressive and 
destructive ways. Especially during conflict, it is difficult for one party to take 
the other’s perspective. Each party perceives the other as an enemy and justifies 
its own action as a right and peaceful fight for self-defence (Kelman 2007). 
When one party starts to consider the other as a threat, existing social values 
diminish, emotional attachments break, interpersonal mistrust develops, and 
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animosity reaches its peak. Ultimately, actions and counteractions become 
hostile due to the fear of being betrayed by the adversary (Bar-Tal and Halperin 
2011). Consequently, the intragroup conflicts escalate and turn into violence. 
1.2 Socio-psychological factors contributing to peacebuilding
Despite their deterrent roles, the socio-psychological factors also serve as social 
bonds that attach groups in a society. The study revealed that properly shaped 
socio-psychological factors like trust, tolerance, positive attitude, emotional 
attachment, cooperation among parties and their respect for one another 
are determining the mirror images they form of other individuals or groups. 
According to Demirdögen (2011), the process of mirror image formation seen 
in intercommunity or intergroup conflicts stems from the sharp contrast in 
perception between the self and the others, which in turn makes the win-win 
approach impossible. However, insight from Deutsch (2006b) shows us that this 
impossible approach becomes possible when the conflicting parties are willing to 
come to a round table discussion, listen to each other and genuinely understand 
their competitors’ emotions and feelings. However, this requires rebuilding 
intergroup trust, renewing circumstantial beliefs, and reconfiguring emotional 
attachments that became detached due to fears and frustrations during the 
conflict (Bar-Tal and Halperin 2011; Kelman 2005). Based on perspectives 
such as these, the gumaa system uses full confession, honest repentance, and 
sincere apology as a fertile soil in which the seed of peace is germinated and 
rejuvenated. The peacebuilding strategies and procedures used in this system 
focus on reestablishing violated social rules and norms. 
2. Conflict dynamics in Haramaya district
Haramaya is one of the districts in eastern Hararghe zone. It has 35 kebeles (the 
lowest administrative units in government structure) with a total population of 
271 018 living on an overall area of 5 600 km2 (Federal Democratic Republic 
of Ethiopia 2007). The majority of the people in the district are Nole and 
Ala Oromo clans and they are Muslims in their religion. These people, like 
other Oromo people, have different customary systems in which elders are 
considered as wise (having wisdom) and responsible for teaching about peace 
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and peaceful coexistence, resolving conflicts, and nurturing Oromo culture 
and tradition. Age-based seniority is therefore the most important factor in the 
community’s socio-psychological relationships. Agriculture is the major source 
of their livelihood where khat1 and vegetable production takes the lion’s share. 
The district is known for resource-induced inter- and intragroup conflicts 
among and within different clans of the same ethnic groups. Scarcity of land and 
water are stated as the major causes for the inter- and intra-conflicts observed 
in the district. 
2.1 Inter- and intragroup conflicts in Haramaya district
Intergroup conflict in this particular context refers to conflicts among clans or 
sub-clans whereas intragroup conflict refers to conflicts within a clan or sub-clan 
and between members of a family. Compared to intergroup conflicts, intragroup 
conflicts are more widely observed in the district. Both these types of conflict are 
usually embedded in socio-economic conditions that put members of a group in 
opposing positions. Thus, the conflicts are more complex and polarised in their 
nature, turbulent in their patterns, and cyclical in their lifespan. Issues of land 
ownership, such as boundaries, pockets of cultivable lands, and water points, are 
stated as the major causes of intergroup violent conflicts. This type of conflict is 
usually observed among members of different clans and/or sub-clans who share 
boundaries of cultivable lands. 
Intragroup conflicts among members of a family can be classified as: a) conflict 
among brothers where the elder and younger brothers are in conflict due to 
dissatisfaction over the fair share of land entrusted to them by their family; 
b) conflict among half-brothers where the children are from two or more 
different fathers or mothers and some of them are deprived of the right to 
inherit or get access to their family’s land and resources on it; c) conflict between 
children and their fathers where children believe they are not given their fair 
share of land; d) conflict between children and their mothers when mothers, 
especially step-mothers, are denied the right over the land they inherited from 
their husbands; e) conflict between daughters and their families since girls are 
usually excluded culturally from inheriting their fathers’ land. 
1 Catcha edulis, a stimulant plant, the leaves of which are used for chewing.
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2.2 Land and family disputes 
Eastern Hararghe zone in general has land scarcity, high cash-crop production, 
unpredictable rainfall, and a complicated agricultural profile (Hammond 1999). 
Haramaya district is one of the districts in the zone where land has especial 
economical and social values in the community. In general, land in this particular 
district is considered as a source of economy, reliable social security, and an asset 
that grants respect in the community. However, scarcity of cultivable land and its 
mismatch with population size are becoming very serious problems responsible 
for violent conflicts between neighbours and among family members. 
The mismatch between family size and land area, the rapid commercialisation 
of agricultural products like khat and vegetables, and the significant income 
generated from them are causing unhealthy competition among groups and/
or individuals. This increases the level of intolerance among family members. 
The data obtained from the court also confirmed to us that land-based 
intragroup conflicts in the district stand second in frequency to domestic 
violence (disputes between husbands and wives). 
In Haramaya district, especially in the rural areas, land is the most valuable 
property that families entrust to their children. Whenever boys reach the age to 
lead their own independent lives, the father is expected to give them a piece of 
land. One of the reasons for the conflicts between children and their family is 
therefore when either the father is not willing to share his land with his children 
or the children feel they do not get their fair share. The quest for accumulating 
personal wealth for survival and the perception of constraining factors result 
in negative feelings towards the father’s decisions. These become common 
psychological factors that motivate children towards aggression and make them 
act violently against their families. Thus, in the district, it is not strange to see 
a son killing his father or mother, or brothers killing each other over issues of 
minor importance. The conflict, for example, could start between a father and 
his son when the son believes what he has received from his father is not fair 
compared to what his brothers previously received. The conflict escalates when 
other family members join the conflict to defend either of the parties. 
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More complex and violent land-induced intragroup conflict can happen among 
the family when the father dies without entrusting his land to any of the family 
members. The conflict can become very complex if the man is polygamous. 
In this case, conflict may take place between the widows, the widows and their 
husband’s brother/s, children and their stepmother, or between stepbrothers. 
Besides, close relatives of the widows may also join this conflict to defend the 
women’s right while close relatives of the dead person may join the conflict to 
defend the right of the children who may not be mature enough to fight for 
themselves. Consequently, the conflict can easily expand from intragroup to 
intergroup conflict. This type of conflict is highly polarised and usually difficult 
to solve in the formal justice system. It causes death, serious injuries, and damage 
to property. Usually homes are burned, properties are damaged, and families are 
forced to flee their homes. 
Conflicts between daughters and their families is an emerging factor in the 
conflict dynamics due to the difference between women’s constitutional right 
and their cultural right to inherit land from their families. Culturally, girls have 
no right to inherit land from their families due to two major assumptions. 
First, it is assumed that daughters go to their husbands’ land when they get 
married. Second, if a daughter is given land, it is assumed that, through marriage, 
she will bring a man who is out of the family to the land. So, the father does 
not entrust land to his daughter. Even if the father wants to include her in the 
inheritance of his land, her brothers may not agree or allow her to establish a 
family and live on that land. The Ethiopian constitution (Federal Democratic 
Republic of Ethiopia 1995: article 35, sub-article 7), however, grants women 
equal rights with men with respect to the use, transfer, administration, and 
control of land. Because of this constitutional right, daughters claim to inherit 
land from their families. However, the mismatch between law and culture 
puts daughters and their families in opposing positions and causes intragroup 
conflict. The conflict situation becomes tense and complex if the daughters 
are married because husbands join the conflict to defend their wives’ right. 
This situation easily turns the intragroup into intergroup conflict.
In general, land-induced family disputes are continually aggravated. Ever-
increasing family size, shrinking of a family’s land area, high unemployment 
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rate, lack of alternative livelihood mechanisms and income-generating schemes, 
climate change and environmental degradation, lack of effective and coordinated 
natural resources management and utilisation policies are exacerbating the 
situation. So, having control over land is perceived as a means by which one 
can secure his and his family’s wellbeing in the community. Consequently, 
the emotional attachment to land is becoming stronger than the emotional 
attachments among relatives. In general, in the study area, the egocentric 
competition over scarce land is resulting in ever-increasing interpersonal 
violence and this is rapidly weakening the unity and integrity within each family. 
The eroded moral bondage among members of a family and the overall declining 
social cohesion among the community are negatively affecting the socio-cultural 
cosmos. The above conflict dynamics reveals how unhealthy competition among 
parties is eroding the social values and disintegrating the emotional attachments 
among members of a group, which in turn disturbs social interactions and 
serve as a fertile ground for the germination of inter- and intragroup conflicts. 
The overall conflict situation can also show us how greed and grievance 
mushroom into irrational thinking and drive people into violent conflicts and 
highly polarised groups in the community. Reinforcing both the informal and 
the formal institutions may help curb these complex societal problems. 
3. The traditional conflict-resolving mechanism and the 
formal justice system
The formal institutions and justice systems in the district are trying their level 
best to prevent, manage and resolve the inter- and intragroup conflicts observed 
in the district. However, it was discovered that these formal institutions have 
a plethora of challenges that constrain them from sustainably resolving the 
above-mentioned complex conflicts. Besides, the formal institutions naturally 
lack mechanisms by which they can revitalise the eroded social values and 
reintegrate the divided parties in the community. Apart from bringing offenders 
to justice, the formal institutions do very little for the socio-psychological 
aspects of the conflict. The animosity, fear, frustration, and anger that developed 
and became deep-rooted among the conflicting parties remain untouched. 
The eroded emotional attachments among close or distant family members 
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remain unbridged. The trauma developed from the conflict is left untreated. 
Above all, the developed mistrust among parties remains untouched and 
leads to a refusal to take risks in negotiations (Bar-Tal and Halperin 2011). 
During the conflict, the objective interests of either of the conflicting parties 
remain unsatisfied while the subjective interests get worse. All of these ultimately 
motivate one or another of the parties to retaliation, which in turn complicates 
the case. Thus, as respondents in the formal institutions stated, the formal 
justice systems alone may not bring long-lasting and sustainable solutions to the 
complex inter- and intragroup conflicts that exist in the district.
The formal justice system sees the causes of conflict through the disciplinary lens 
created from the existing legal frameworks. Ultimately, the decision will depend 
on data obtained from the plaintiff, the defendant and the witness, and on other 
circumstantial evidence. However, all of these sources of data may fail to present 
the truth due to backdoor deals among the plaintiffs, the defendants and the 
witnesses. Respondents revealed that conflicting parties usually bribe the police, 
the judges, the prosecutors and/or the witnesses in order to bring justice to 
their own side. Thus, the justice system becomes more difficult and problematic 
(Lewicki 2006), and its outcome could also be considered as unjust by either of 
the parties. Unsatisfied parties go to the next higher level of justice for appeal and 
consequently justice may also linger for quite a long time. When decisions are 
eventually passed, unaddressed social, moral, or psychological factors may bring 
repercussions onto the future peaceful coexistence of the conflicting parties and 
their families. This in turn escalates the intensity, magnitude, and scope of the 
conflict. So, the formal justice system usually creates turbulent conflict dynamics 
rather than bringing long-lasting solutions to the conflicting parties. 
Usually, conflicting parties go to the formal justice system holding the hatred 
developed from the moral and psychological anguish generated in the conflict. 
They develop reasonings that they believe will help them defeat their opponent 
in front of the court. So, parties produce competing narratives with all sides 
having their own version of truth about what really happened (Lerche 2000). 
In this case, it becomes difficult to get genuine information about conflict 
causes and the driving factors. For various reasons beyond the imagination 
of the judges and prosecutors, a witness may present biased data or distorted 
21
The reintegrating role of a traditional conflict-resolving mechanism in Ethiopia
information in order to defend a party. Thus, reliance on eye-witnesses can 
be misleading (challenging) because some witnesses may be guided by self-
interest or fear (Lerche 2000). If the offender is found guilty, he may be put in 
prison. However, imprisoning the offender still does not bring a long-lasting 
and satisfactory solution to the victimised group. This is mainly because those 
who are directly responsible for violence leave victims with physical, emotional 
and psychological trauma, which in the long run results in anger, fear, and 
insecurity (Castro and Galace 2008). Similar situations are frequently observed 
in the research site. Even though offenders are put in prison, the unhealed 
psychological factors motivate the victim’s family or relatives to take vengeance 
on the offender’s relatives or property. 
The traditional conflict resolution mechanisms are playing great roles in the 
conflict resolution and reintegration process. One of these institutions used in 
the research site is called gumaa, and is playing very significant roles in bringing 
the conflicting parties to acknowledge each other’s perspectives and bargain for 
mutual benefits. In this mechanism, priority is given to social and psychological 
reconstruction. Peacebuilding strategies are used to restore violated social 
rules and detached emotional attachments through full confession, honest 
repentance, and sincere apology, rather than through the mere restitution of 
and compensation for lost life or property. Revitalisation of the normal social 
cosmos is made possible by restoring the eroded socio-psychological values. 
In spite of its declining power and sphere of influence, the gumaa system 
is still effectively managing the inter- and intragroup conflicts. This system 
is deeply embedded in the culture of the society. It is culturally empowered, 
easily accessible, and user-friendly. Unlike the formal justice system, gumaa, as 
other traditional justice systems, is close to the lives of many ordinary people 
(Macfarlane 2007). It is in the community, for the community, and by the 
community. It costs less and takes less time to bring criminals to justice and 
to bring justice to the victim. Parties’ credible confessions and full remorse are 
taken as prerequisite for bringing the conflicting parties to negotiation and 
reconciliation. The approaches used in this mechanism are not investigative as 
those of the judiciary system; rather they are reflective, narrative and restorative. 
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The system uses renewal of socio-psychological attachments as a means 
to achieve long-lasting reconciliation among parties. Because it is deeply 
embedded in their culture, the community has a strong sense of ownership 
of and belongingness to the system. Like other traditional justice systems in 
the country, it is more flexible and influential, and affects the lives of more 
ordinary people than the formal justice system (Macfarlane 2007). It has the 
capacity to effectively rebuild social bonds and reintegrate conflicting parties 
morally, socially and psychologically. It has the power and legitimacy to stop 
community conflicts and it helps the parties to eliminate hostility and a desire for 
revenge; reduce their polarisations; and ultimately restore peace without any 
external pressure. 
The gumaa system is capable of creating an environment conducive to justice 
through narrations of and reflections on past experiences related to the 
conflict. Narrations help the parties come to a revelation of root causes of their 
conflicts, acknowledgement of apologies for atrocities, and enumeration of bad 
experiences the parties acquired from the conflict (Karbo and Mutisi 2008). 
The system manages the socio-psychological factors through negotiations. 
It closely monitors the conflicting parties, treats their fear and frustration, and 
repairs the societal cracks. 
The legitimacy of the system is increased through the nomination of elders who 
are mature in years, knowledgeable about the process, and rich in their practical 
experiences. Such elders are careful about their language and are expected not 
to use derogative words or expressions of victory, defeat, hatred or enmity in 
the negotiation process. Compared to the formal justice systems, the traditional 
conflict resolution system is also free from bribing and lobbying. So, suspicion of 
and dissatisfaction with the traditional system are rare. If there is dissatisfaction, 
parties are free to present their appeal to the elders’ council. It is also their right 
to nominate a more knowledgeable elder who can assess the overall procedure. 
The nominated elder scrutinises whether the procedures followed are in line with 
the heera (customary law and justice procedure). If the elder does find gaps in 
the process, corrective measures will be taken; if not, the party could be forced to 
indemnify the elders’ council from delaying the process. Disempowering youth 
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and women in the process is mentioned as a pitfall of the gumaa system. Apart 
from participating in the rituals, youth and women have no say in the processes. 
In the gumaa system, decisions are not based on biased data obtained from 
witnesses but are based on parties’ repentance and revelations. This mechanism 
also has its own system of secretly investigating crimes committed against 
human life or property. When, due to a long-time grudge or vengeance, a life 
is taken or property is damaged in the absence of eyewitnesses, and when the 
suspected offender is not willing to confess, the suspected person is forced to go 
through a traditional investigation process called hirbuu. Hirbuu is the highest 
level of the investigation process and is used as a last option to examine suspects. 
The community still has a very strong belief that hiding the truth while going 
through this ritual is a sin and will bring bad fortune not only to the suspected 
person but also to the offender’s family and clan. Thus, anybody who conducts 
this ritual has to be mature enough to carry out the performance. 
Hirbuu is used when circumstantial evidence strengthens the elders’ and family’s 
suspicion, but the suspected offender denies the fact. Maximum effort is made to 
critically interrogate the suspected offender before hirbuu. Clan members of the 
suspect strongly warn him not to lie and bring something bad to his children, 
the family and/or the clan. The family, clan leader and elders use different 
strategies of their own in order to make the suspected person reveal the truth. 
If the person keeps on denying, the elder who is responsible to perform the 
ritual collects different materials like knifes, thorns, grass, nails, dry wood, fire 
(or matches), water and a stone, and takes them to a grave-yard together with 
the suspected person. Then a grave is prepared and all the materials are put in it. 
After the grave has been made ready, the elder who is the master of the ceremony 
goes down into the grave, lights a fire, and comes out of the grave. Next, the 
suspected person is asked to go into the grave and swear, holding knifes and 
thorns, putting water on the fire, putting the stone into the water, etc. The clan 
and the victim’s family representatives attend the process. The overall process is 
traditionally called gawitoo. 
This process, due to its frightening and terrible nature, creates very strong 
psychological pressure on the suspected person. If the suspected person has 
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committed a crime against somebody’s life or property, he cannot withstand 
this horrible process and carry out the ritual. Consequently, in most cases, 
the suspected person acknowledges guilt before he reaches the hirbuu stage. 
If the suspected person has the courage to go through the hirbuu process, it is 
believed that there is no blood on his hands and the plaintiff removes his/her 
charge. Once hirbuu has been performed, the suspected person gets undoubted 
trust from the elders and the family. There is no hatred or grudge that remains 
between these parties. The two parties live together in peace and love. 
4. The traditional conflict resolution process in  
Haramaya district
Gumaa is one of the traditional conflict resolution processes widely used by the 
Oromo people. However, its performance varies from place to place, according 
to the specific culture in which it is practised. Although it can be used in cases 
of vendetta, revenge, blood price or compensation, feud, and the ritual of 
purification that follows homicide (Dejene 2002), it can generally be seen as 
a compensation and purification process that follows a conflict. The ultimate 
goal of any traditional conflict resolution mechanism is socio-psychological 
reintegration, reestablishment of community relationships and reunification 
of offenders into their communities (Karbo and Mutisi 2008) by revitalising 
emotional attachments of the parties in conflict. Similarly, the goal of the gumaa 
system is to restore the social, moral, and psychological values damaged in the 
conflict. The important thing in the system is not judging the past, but rather 
creating a peaceful future life. The primary outcome of the system is not only 
to maximise the benefits of the victim through compensation and restitution, 
but also to help conflicting parties and victims recover from socio-psychological 
crises and from trauma and agony. The focus is not only on punishing either of 
the conflicting parties, but is also on restoring relationships by reconciling the 
groups in the conflict (Choudree 1999). The purpose and practice of the system 
make it meaningful, fruitful and sustainable. Elders, especially clan leaders, 
are the heads of the system and they have multiple key roles in the process. 
The following section briefly discusses the roles of elders in this traditional 
conflict resolution process. 
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4.1 Roles of a neutral third party and elders
In the research area, elders and clan leaders are considered by the community 
as legitimate agents to strengthen peaceful coexistence among the community. 
Whenever there are conflicts in the community, it is the responsibility of the third 
and neutral party, the clan or sub-clan leader, to intervene and stop the violence. 
This neutral third party is traditionally called Eddo. If Eddo fails to intervene in 
the conflict before it escalates and causes more damage, he is considered by the 
community as an irresponsible leader who does not maintain the societal values. 
This seriously affects his legitimacy in all social affairs. 
In the gumaa process, Eddo also plays crucial roles to stop revenge and bring 
conflicting parties to negotiation. Whenever somebody is killed in conflict, the 
perpetrator (offender) goes to Eddo and asks for asylum. In order to secure 
his asylum, the perpetrator has to confess to Eddo what he did against his 
opponent(s). Upon the offender’s request, Eddo hides the offender in a safe and 
secured place where victims cannot find him easily. Eddo gives asylum to the 
offender until the conflict is resolved. To stop vengeance, Eddo immediately goes 
to the elders (usually clan leaders) of the conflicting parties and informs them to 
stop the conflict. Elders and clan leaders show their collaboration by cascading 
the same to families of the conflicting parties. Eddo then asks elders of each 
conflicting party to appoint two individuals of their own who will join him to 
form an ad hoc elders’ council. Elders nominated for this council are expected to 
be neutral and the most respected people in the community. Eddo also serves as 
a chairperson in this elders’ council. 
The two elders nominated from each party are responsible for convincing their 
respective clan and family members not to attempt to get revenge. They function 
as a go-between for the conflicting parties so as to reduce the tensions and 
turn the situation back to its normal condition. They give especial attention to 
youth and closely follow their activities. Elders tell stories and describe the best 
practices of their traditional conflict resolution mechanisms so as to increase the 
parties’ trust and confidence in the restorative justice system. If life is taken due 
to the conflict, elders from the offender’s side collect an ox, khat, firewood, and 
money from their clan and take them to the victim’s family. This is traditionally 
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called waan awaalchaa (things for facilitating funeral). In the case of injury or 
physical damage, elders take a sheep to the victim to help him recover from his 
injury and it is traditionally called shaffee. 
The elders’ council consisting of these five elders is the highest legitimate body 
to mediate between the conflicting parties, resolve the conflicts, and reintegrate 
parties in conflict. The second but most significant and designated task of the 
elders’ council is to analyse the causes and triggering factors of the conflict. 
The elders’ council is responsible to closely follow up the situation, critically 
and creatively evaluate the causes of conflict, and urge the offender’s clan to 
fulfil the required rituals for the conflict resolution process. The elders’ council 
is also responsible to bring on board key personalities from the victim’s family 
and clan and convince them to agree in principle that their case be adjudicated 
traditionally. In the case of death, the elders’ council facilitates conditions for 
carrying out different cultural rituals traditionally called wadaja (a cultural 
ceremony to express sorrow and respect for the dead body). Respected elders 
from the offender’s clan also attend the wadaja ceremony to express their sorrow. 
Success in performing the wadaja ceremony guarantees to all parties concerned 
that the conflict will be traditionally adjudicated. 
4.2 Categories of conflicts resolved through the gumaa system 
In the gumaa system, critical examination of cases of conflict precedes the 
broader conflict resolution and reconciliation process. After thorough analysis 
and critical evaluation of a case, elders classify all causes and triggering factors of 
a conflict into three major groups traditionally called mana dinaa, mana amba, 
and mana danu. 
Mana dinaa (homicide) is the term used for conflicts which are pre-planned, 
deliberate, and instigated with full preparation. When the perpetrator’s action 
against the victim’s life/property is intentional and with full knowledge, and if 
weapons or knifes are used, mana dinaa is categorised as mana dinaa gurachaa 
(showing its seriousness and criminality). Mana amba is when: a) conflict erupts 
out of minor causes; b) the action is not pre-planned and intentional; c) the two 
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parties have had no dispute or grudge before; and d) a life is taken unexpectedly 
due to failure to control emotions, not due to a previously held grudge. 
When either of the conflicting parties unexpectedly kills or harms an innocent 
intervener or peace maker who is trying to stop and calm down the situation, the 
case is classified as mana danu. 
The gumaa system manages the socio-psychological problems, social dilemmas, 
and clans’ uncertainties in all of these conflict cases in the same way. In the case 
of intergroup conflicts, the reinstitutions or compensations given for these three 
categories are also the same. But the mediation and negotiation processes and 
the way the offenders are treated in the processes differ. Of the three types of 
conflict cases, mana amba and mana danu are taken as communal problems and 
the compensations to be given to the victim are collected from the offender’s 
clan. Mana dinaa or mana dinaa gurachaa is considered as the most serious 
crime due to an individual’s greed or grievance. The clan is not asked to help 
the offender. In the past, offenders in this type of conflict were considered by 
the community as brutal, ruthless, and merciless, and their actions were taken 
as a serious violation of basic societal norms. So, the offender was supposed 
to be punished by death. However, since it became non-customary to pass the 
death penalty, the elders’ council used to hand over the offender to the formal 
justice system. The offender faced becoming a social outcast and living in exile. 
Even if he finishes his prison time, he was no longer allowed to show up in the 
community. He was deprived of any membership in the society and the right to 
inherit his family’s property. As a result, key informants stated, conflict among 
members of the same family was not common in the past. Over time, due to the 
enforcement of an individual’s right in the formal law, the above customary law 
no longer functions as it did in the past. Offenders found guilty in the criminal 
justice system can rejoin the community upon release from prison. This, as 
elders pointed out, is causing another conflict dynamic due to unaddressed 
socio-psychological dimensions of the conflict. Elders strongly believe that the 
current ever-increasing animosity among groups is due to the declining power 
of the traditional conflict resolution systems and incompatibility between the 
formal and informal justice systems. 
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4.3 Phases of conflict resolution through the gumaa system 
The gumaa system used in Haramaya district consists of three major phases, 
namely: conflict deescalation, conflict resolution, and reconciliation. The system 
has many rituals in it and is expected to be completed in a month’s time. If the 
offender’s clan could not fulfil what is expected of them within a month, they 
may ask for an extension. The elders’ council, in consultation with the victim’s 
clan, may give some additional days depending on the problem. 
As indicated elsewhere, Eddo’s intervention to stop the conflict is considered 
as the first step to deescalate the tensions. Everything at this initial stage is 
managed carefully and in a very systematic way by the elders’ council, partly 
because dissatisfaction of either of the parties could aggravate the situation and 
lead to a more polarised and politicised conflict. At this initial stage, both parties 
are in fear of conflict reescalation and its possible consequences. The overall 
situation at this stage is therefore tense and unpredictable. Both parties are very 
alert to their opponents’ action and reaction. Consequently, it is mandatory for 
the elders’ council to closely follow the situation. Thus, the elders’ intervention 
and their collaboration with clan leaders play a vital role to lessen the tension 
and deescalate the conflict. Since elders are highly respected and responsible 
for keeping cultural norms, nobody in the community is impudent enough to 
ignore their advice. Doing so is considered as a violation of cultural norms that 
are of basic importance in social affairs. 
The first phase of the gumaa process is symbolic and has many implications. 
Acceptance of waan awaalchaa or shaffee symbolises the victim’s amenability 
to the gumaa system. Thus, it guarantees that no more action will be taken 
against the offender or his property and family. In this community, failure or 
delay to fulfil these two symbolic gestures of peace loving also has very serious 
implications for the victim’s family or clan. If waan awaalchaa is not given 
before the funeral, it is interpreted as underestimating the family, the clan, and/
or the action against them. Similarly, denial of waan awaalchaa or shaffee by the 
victim’s family or clan also indicates holding a grudge, which in turn implicates 
the victims’ preparation for counter-attack as vengeance. Therefore, it is a must 
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for the elders’ council to pacify those involved in the case and convince the 
affected party and their clan to accept these contributions. 
The second phase of the gumaa system is the stage at which the conflict resolution 
process begins. Most, but not all, of the conflict resolution rituals are performed 
during this phase. Key family members and six key clan representatives from 
each party are brought on board. Clan representatives carry out discussions 
among themselves, but do not meet with others out of their clan. Meeting places 
are prepared for them separately. The meetings are never convened in rooms, 
but outside under trees. Apart from facilitating discussions and liaison between 
the two parties, the elders’ council does not discuss or share anything with the 
two groups. Joining either of the groups is considered as taking sides. Other 
family members are there just to attend the ritual.
It is mandatory for the offender’s clan to host all participants in the conflict 
resolution process. The clan carefully prepares convenient meeting places, 
three separate rooms for accommodation (one for the victim’s clan, one for the 
offender’s clan, and one for the elders’ council), and food, milk, and khat for 
participants. The offender’s clan is also expected to prepare fifteen animals (cows 
and oxen) to be given to the victim’s family as restitution, traditionally called 
obsafi imimit. Of these animals, one is expected to be a fattened ox, traditionally 
called sanaga hasawaa (an ox for negotiation). 
The second phase of the gumaa system gives major emphasis to moral and 
psychological reintegration among the conflicting parties. The six elders from 
both conflicting parties come face to face for the first time to slaughter the ox 
(sanaga hasawaa). The two groups together slaughter the ox and split it into 
two equal parts divided at its spinal cord. The right side of the ox is taken by 
the elders from the offender’s clan while the left part is taken by those from the 
victim’s clan. It is believed that the animosity between parties is cleansed after 
this ox is slaughtered. However, the two groups never eat together at this stage. 
Each group takes its share to its room or tent and eats with other people from the 
clan. The elders’ council do not eat with either of the parties so as to maintain 
their impartiality throughout. Though it is not mandatory, the offender’s clan 
prepares a goat or sheep for the elders’ council. 
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As we can see from the performance, the reunification is not physical, but rather 
psychological. The approach is top-down, where first the clan representatives 
from both parties come together and share flesh of an animal and cascade 
the same to the relatives of the two parties. The performance symbolises the 
moral and psychological reintegration of the conflicting parties. Furthermore, 
it is used to symbolise the groups’ shared responsibility to reinstate their social 
relationships. It is believed that the enmity developed between the parties 
is cleared once they jointly slaughter the animal. Early the next morning, the 
offender’s clan, in the presence of the elders’ council, hands over the remaining 
animals to the victim’s family. These animals are expected to be healthy and with 
all their body parts functioning properly. Upon completion of the second phase, 
another appointment will be set for fifteen days later to perform the third and 
final phase of the gumaa system. At the end of the second phase, the offender, 
who has been taken care of by Eddo, is shown to elders and families for the first 
time since he committed the crime against human life. The offender is given to 
his clan leaders; however, he is not expected to wash or change his clothes, cut his 
hair and nails, take a shower, eat with people, or participate in any social affair 
before the third stage is performed. 
The third phase of the gumaa system is used for reconciliation. Above all, close 
families of the conflicting parties meet face to face for the first time since the 
conflict occurred. At this stage, the two parties reunify and the offender is 
reintegrated with the victims once and forever. The offender’s clan prepares 
milk or honey and gives it to the elders’ council. One of the members of the 
elders’ council calls the victim’s father and the offender to come out to the front. 
If the victim’s father is not alive, the victim’s elder brother is invited. Next, the 
elder gives the cup with milk or honey to the victim’s father or elder brother. 
The father/brother takes the milk or honey from the elder and feeds it to the 
offender. And then, the offender in his turn takes the milk or honey and feeds the 
victim’s father or brother. The elder then gives the same cup to the victim’s family 
and asks them to feed the offender’s family. The offender’s family also does the 
same. Finally, elders from both parties feed each other the milk or honey from the 
cup. Rituals at this phase symbolise the parties’ social, psychological, and physical 
reintegration. The entire process symbolises forgiveness and the reunification of 
31
The reintegrating role of a traditional conflict-resolving mechanism in Ethiopia
the two polarised parties and their families. After this performance, it is believed 
that all parties are fully reconciled and reintegrated. Feeding each other milk and 
honey symbolises an exit from a distressed, agonised, and nasty life and entry 
into a sweet, harmonious, and peaceful relationship. It also indicates the end of 
hatred and enmity and the revival of love and symbiotic relationships which in 
turn restores the socio-psychological relationships among the parties. 
The reconciliation process at the third stage uses a bottom-up approach wherein 
the process is first performed between key family members and the offender, 
then followed by reconciliation between families of the conflicting parties, 
and finalised by reconciliation between the clans of the conflicting parties. 
Thus, reconciliation is made not only between key actors but also with the entire 
community. After this reconciliation process, it is believed that the offender 
is fully cleansed and the family is reunited socially and psychologically. The 
parties no longer consider one another as a threat. Everybody leaves the bad 
conflict experience behind and starts to think about a future peaceful life. The 
parties reinitiate their peaceful coexistence and keep on supporting each other 
morally, socially, and economically. At the last stage of the reconciliation process, 
the offender’s clan gives the thirty-five remaining animals traditionally called 
Agajuma. The Agajuma are shared among the clan members who have a close 
blood relationship to the victim. Customarily, the victim’s family has no share 
in these animals. 
In the case of intragroup conflict, the gumaa process is completed in the first two 
stages and it takes only fifteen days. Since the conflict is between members of 
the same clan, the reconciliation process is not performed and no reinstitution 
is given to clan members. In this case, Eddo is selected from the other clan 
whereas elders are nominated from sub-clans. Compensation for victims of the 
intragroup conflict is limited to fifteen animals. 
Compared to the intragroup conflicts, the intergroup conflicts need to be 
managed carefully because polarisation between the parties can be increased 
and can expand to other clans and sub-clans. With regard to intragroup conflict, 
since there is an intense pressure on the victims’ family from the clan members 
and other relatives, it is very likely to be resolved traditionally. Above all, the 
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families of the victim do not bypass the traditional mechanism and go to the 
formal justice system. Due to the offender’s blood relationship to the victim, 
they also show more interest in the socio-psychological rehabilitation, trauma 
healing, and compensation for lost and/or damaged property than in retaliation. 
In general, the community still believes that the gumaa system is an important 
indigenous conflict resolution mechanism used to solve their social, economic, 
and political problems. Thus, they have a strong belief in and emotional 
attachment to the system. However, this does not mean that the gumaa system 
is 100% pleasing to all parties. Nowadays, it is very difficult to get fifty-one 
animals from clan members because there are only a few animals per household. 
Consequently, victims are given money which is not equivalent to the animals’ 
market value. However, since the primary goal of gumaa is not maximising 
compensation, the majority of the parties adjudicated by the system still 
consider the change in compensation positively. Since the overall process is 
open, participatory, and transparent, parties have great trust in the process. 
Elders and clan leaders continue to monitor the progress of victims, helping 
them to recover from the moral and psychological crisis they encountered. 
Sustaining the psychological rehabilitation and emotional reunification of the 
affected party is given due emphasis.
5. Conclusion
The intensity of inter- and intragroup conflicts in Haramaya district is continually 
increasing, mainly due to land scarcity, degradation of societal norms, and 
disintegration of socio-psychological relationships. Insights from the study 
indicate that at the same time interest in indigenous knowledge and practices is 
significantly becoming weakened due to both internal and external factors. Of 
all the internal factors, underestimation of cultural values due to ‘modernised 
thinking’, increasingly egocentric human behaviour, and erosion of the societal 
norms (resulting from unhealthy competition over scarce resources) are taken as 
major factors seriously threatening the existence and legitimacy of the traditional 
conflict resolution mechanism. Lack of support for, lack of cooperation with, 
and cooptation by the formal institutions are considered as external factors 
threatening the legitimacy of elders and their indigenous conflict resolution 
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practices. Experience also shows us that formal institutions usually advocate 
bringing offenders to the formal justice system where their cases are adjudicated 
by the court. However, the study suggested that the justice system alone cannot 
provide sustainable solutions unless it is coordinated and harmonised with the 
indigenous conflict resolution and reconciliation mechanisms. This is mainly 
because, usually, the formal justice systems do not deal with resolving the socio-
psychological tensions among the conflicting parties. But the traditional conflict 
resolution mechanism can help the formal justice systems fill in this gap. From 
this perspective, there is a huge gap between the two systems at the research 
site. In most cases, the two systems do not consult each other. The indigenous 
conflict resolution mechanisms are disempowered and their cultural values 
are compromised. Elders believe that disempowering the traditional systems is 
directly contributing to the erosion of social norms which in turn contributes to 
the ever-increasing inter- and intragroup violent conflicts. 
Because of population pressure and lack of clear land use policy, conflict over land 
remains a critical challenge to the community in the research area. Sometimes, 
the victim’s family may be forced to lead a destitute life after the conflict. Wives 
may become widows and children orphans, and fathers/mothers may become 
helpless due to the irresponsible violent action of individuals. Victims’ rights 
remain infringed because conflict might have taken the ones who defend their 
rights. But the offender, even in a prison, lives a relatively better normal life. 
Upon his release from prison, the offender re-joins that community/family and 
starts to lead his own life. For the victims’ families, living side by side with their 
enemy is becoming a bitter experience difficult to accept. Consequently, the 
victim’s family and/or clan may hold a grudge and live with a high degree of 
anger and anguish against their enemies. As long as the two parties are living 
together, grudge and frustration may trigger retaliation and more violent 
conflict. These conditions put the conflicts into a vicious cycle.
Insights from the study also confirmed to us that the formal justice systems lacks 
capacity to stop the ever-increasing horrible intragroup conflict dynamics in 
the community because they have a plethora of challenges like lack of qualified 
manpower and dedicated institutions. As stated by the elders and endorsed by 
people in the formal justice system, psychologically disturbing an opponent, 
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divesting individuals of their rights and/or eliminating a competitor from the 
group are newly emerging means to achieve previously unachievable goals and 
get full access to and control over scarce resources. This outrageous behaviour is 
seriously eroding the emotional attachment within and among groups, which in 
turn leads to violent conflicts among parties. 
To meet the emerging new challenges, interventions should be tailor-made, 
multidisciplinary, integrated, and multifaceted. Given their societal significance, 
the basic values and principles of the gumaa system have to be maintained and 
passed to the young generation who are in a chaotic socio-psychological dilemma. 
To minimise the current resource-induced socio-psychological tensions in the 
community, the eroded social values should be restored, renowned customary 
institutions like the gumaa system should be reinforced, and the community, 
especially the elders, should be capacitated. Such improvements could become 
possible through justice reform, cooperative resource management, community 
empowerment, awareness-raising strategies, and sustained community dialogue. 
The formal justice systems should coopt or cooperate with the customary justice 
system to deal with issues related to peace and conflict.
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